Homage to Kramatorsk
Britain can learn much more from the Ukrainian war effort, writes Luke John Davies
Talk to analysts of the Ukraine conflict, and comparisons to the Spanish Civil War will often come up. The theory runs that, just as Spain proved that all future conflicts would be decided by air power, Ukraine is proving that all future conflicts will be decided by UAVs (i.e. drones). That is a surface-level analysis. If we stop there, we may learn the wrong lessons.
1930s RAF strategists, along with much of the world, saw the Spanish conflict as proof of the ideas of the Italian military theorist Giulio Douhet. Douhet argued that mass bombing from the air would force a nation’s surrender by destroying the morale of its civilian population. This is what analysts expected, so this is what they saw.
In reality, what happened in Spain comprehensively disproved Douhet’s theory. Mass bombing hardened civilian morale, as it has in Ukraine today. Nevertheless, Douhet’s ideas influenced the British government’s response to the Blitz deep into the war.
The Luftwaffe drew different conclusions. They noticed that mass bombing did not lead to surrender. Instead, they established the doctrine of close air support and developed new fighter tactics. They treated the war in Spain as a testing ground and did not succumb to the confirmation bias that others did. When the Luftwaffe launched the Blitz, it targeted air bases, radar, defence factories and infrastructure. Only on Hitler’s personal intervention did they switch to mass bombing civilians, which proved a significant strategic error.
How, then, can the UK approach the Ukraine conflict with clear eyes? Allocating £5bn for drones in the Defence Investment Plan is the right decision, but we need careful planning to use that money effectively.
First, we should recognise that a better historical parallel for the development of drones than aerial bombing may be the deployment of barbed wire in the First World War. UAVs are predominantly area-denial and deep-strike weapons, producing stalemates and static frontlines.
Second, we must not act as if this war is being fought only with drones, or rush to declare other weaponry ‘obsolete’. The Ukrainians are using everything.
Take the British navy’s aircraft carriers, for example. Large warships are indeed vulnerable, although this is nothing new. When protecting Red Sea shipping from the Houthis, UK destroyers were firing expensive Sea Viper missiles at cheap Shahed drones, exhausting their supplies and having to leave to rearm. From an area-denial perspective, we lost without the enemy landing a single shot. Magazine depth is now the deciding factor in a naval task group’s endurance.
But that does not mean aircraft carriers have lost their value as instruments of force projection. After all, airfields are just as exposed: Ukraine’s Spiderweb operation struck bombers thousands of miles from the frontline. At least a carrier can move.
We also need to grapple with the economics of interception. A Shahed drone costs $40,000–$80,000. The missiles used to intercept it cost millions. Russian and Iranian Shahed drones are using—ironically—Fabian tactics to wear down Western stockpiles.
The key statistics the UK should focus on, then, are the cost per interception and the depth of stockpiles for different systems, not just total spending. Ukraine’s interceptor drones cost a few thousand dollars. These are the systems we must adopt, allowing our high-end air-defence missiles to focus on ballistic and cruise missile threats that interceptor drones cannot yet tackle.
Arguing over headline numbers makes for a good media spat, but not necessarily good military planning. Our industrial strategy will be a crucial component of our military strategy. Defence production needs to be distributed, with many small manufacturers across the regions, providing skilled jobs outside the southeast as an added benefit. This must include components as well as final assembly. We are currently heavily reliant on China for motors, batteries, chips and optics, creating a strategic weakness.
Our procurement systems must also ensure a steady stream of orders, rather than one large order. Cold production lines take weeks to start up, and stoppages mean manufacturers lose economies of scale. Continuous production is therefore essential.
The final lesson is to remain humble as well as clear-eyed. The Ukrainians now have the world’s most advanced drone forces and drone production capabilities, from which we have much to learn. Accepting that, in this respect, we are the junior partner in the relationship may be the most important lesson of all.
